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The paper reviews the prominent features of a continuous, combinatorial auction.   The 
Section 1 is an introduction that provides some background research and overview.  The 
continuous combinatorial auction evolved in response to experience with combinatorial 
auctions based on bidding rounds. The background material helps with the contrasts 
related to auction architectures.  Section 2 consists of a few background definitions.  
Section 3 develops the rules and procedures, which are central features of the mechanism.  
Section 4 outlines important operational features such as information and query 
functions. As should become clear, the continuous combinatorial auction does not 
compute or even use prices per item.  The fashioning of bids on packages of items is not 
guided by a sum of the prices of items in the package.  Section 5 contains illustrations of 
the interfaces, which summarize how the mechanism operates with human participants. 
The section consists of a series of screen shots that illustrate how the system looks from 
the point of view of a bidder.  Section 6 addresses performance in experiments and in the 
field. 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
 
The history of the continuous combinatorial auction marks the evolution of the 
mechanism. The concept of a combinatorial auction is due to Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin 
(1982) who were motivated by the use of simultaneous ascending price auctions to 
allocate landing rights (Grether, Isaac, and Plott, (1979 and subsequently published as 
1989)).  The ideas were generalized by Banks, Ledyard, and Porter (1989) to include the 
concept of a “standby queue” which serves a function similar to non-winning bids in the 
current system. 
 
The first example of a continuous combinatorial auction is found at Brewer and Plott 
(1996). They demonstrate that representations in terms of binary confects of packages 
afford both the flexibility for widespread application and the computational speed 
required to support the auction. This early mechanism depended heavily on the existence 
of a fixed set of packages on which bids could be placed.  The computer could quickly 
compute non-intersecting packages that maximized the value of the sale and permitted 
the auction to proceed as a type of continuous, simultaneous, ascending price auction.  
The packages played the role of items on which bids were placed.  The non- intersecting 
packages that produced the most revenue from the auction were declared the leading bids 
at each instant of time.  That first mechanism was followed by slight generalization to a 
procurement problem in which the buyer organized sellers to minimize procurement cost 
and sellers could offer endogenous packages.  The organization was a simultaneous, 
decreasing price auction.    
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In the 1990s, the FCC was considering the adoption of a combinatorial auction as a 
replacement for the simultaneous, rounds-based, ascending price auction that the FCC 
had used to auction parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. The initial research focused on 
a hybrid process that consisted of rounds followed by a continuous phase.  (See the report 
of Charles R. Plott, FCC Why River Conference, May 5-7, 2000). Experiments with the 
hybrid revealed that, that most of the adjustment and efficiently came the continuous 
phase.  That discovery led to the study of combinatorial auctions that operated only in 
continuous time. Of course, the architectures of the continuous combinatorial auctions 
and the traditional auctions based on rounds have some similarities but they have many 
differences that required exploration.   
 
A difference between the continuous auction and rounds auctions is the role and form of 
activity and eligibility requirements.  The continuous auction uses neither, and the rounds 
based auctions use both.  In the rounds auction, “eligibility” is a limitation on the 
packages on which bids can be placed and activity requirements dictate a reduction in 
eligibility if bidding activity is not adequate.  It is a type of “use it or lose it” condition.  
By contrast, the continuous auction is based on special ending clocks that play an 
incentive role similar to activity and eligibility requirements but are much different in 
substance and performance. 
 
 
2. Items and bids 
 
Items. n items are for sale at the auction indexed Y = {1,2,….,n};  
Let S {0,1}n be a combination, set, or package  of items. 
Individuals. m individuals participate in bids M= {1,2,…,m}. Each bidder has an 
Identification Number known only to the bidder.  It is possible to give a bidder several ID 
numbers if the bidder wants them. 
Bids.  A bid is a price and a package of items of the form bji (S) where i is the index of 
the individual submitting the bid, j is the bid number as recorded in the system and S Y 
is a package of items.  
Let bqi (Sq) be bid number q, where i is the bidder and Sq {0,1}n. That is, the qth bid was 
placed by i, for a dollar amount bqi for a package of items Sq. 
Bid Properties.  (i) Bids are submitted under “all or none” conditions.  Either the entire 
package is accepted as a provisional winner or none of it is accepted. (ii) Multiple bids 
can be tendered. (iii) All bids remain in the system and can be selected as provisional 
winners unless cancelled.   
(iv) Provisional winning bids cannot be cancelled. 
 
 
3. Rules and Procedures 
 
Provisional Winners.  After each bid is submitted, the system publishes the set of 
provisionally winning bids.  The provisional winners are bids in the set of bids that would 
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maximize the value of the sale if the auction concluded at that moment subject to the 
condition that no item is contained in more than one provisionally winning bid. 
 
B= all bids submitted and not cancelled. 
xq  {0,1} indicates whether or not the qth bid was accepted as a provisional winner of the 
auction. 
 
W = Provisionally winning bids.  Provisional winners are the subset of all bids, B,  that 
maximize the value of the sale subject to the fact that no item is contained in more than 
one provisional winning bid. 
 
That is, provisional winning bids are q: xq  = argmax R. 
R = Max     xqbqi    Subject to   xqSq   (1,1,1,…,1)     
xq : qB 
 
Non provisional winning bids.  The bids that are not provisional winners remain in the 
system and play an important role. Notice that the computation of the provisional winners 
includes an examination of all bids in the system. Thus, a new bid can be partnered with a 
non provisionally winning bid such that an existing package is broken and the new bid 
and the partnering bid become provisional winners.  The implication is that non winning 
bids exist in the system as potential partners or as the pieces of a complex coalition that 
can be assembled to replace large package bids as provisional winners. By placing a non-
winning bid, the bidder is revealing a willingness to pay for a package, which, 
theoretically, could be a maximum willingness to pay in the absence of mistakes or 
conspiracies. 
 
Notice that this is a complex calculation that could require an examination of all families 
of subsets of bids as candidates for provisionally winning.  Obviously, this can be 
computationally challenging.  Given the sizes of existing auctions and tests, it has not 
presented a problem. 
 
Increment requirements.  The increment requirement represents a major departure for 
standard auctions.  When bids are on a single unit, increment requirements state that new 
bids must be some fixed increment above the price of the currently winning bids on the 
item alone. Thus, the bidding is progressively upward. The increment requirement of the 
continuous combinatorial auction when the bid is a package of items is much different. In 
order to be submitted, a bid need not be high enough to become a provisional winner.  
Furthermore, the increment requirement is not based on the sum of implicit prices 
computed for individual items.  
 
The function of the increment rule as is the case with all increment rules, is to encourage 
bids to move the system to an equilibrium and to do so at a fast pace.  Without special 
rules regarding increments, the system could be filled with bids that are dominated by 
existing bids. Let v(S) be the maximum value for which the set S could be sold given the 
bids in the system. This value is determined by computing the winning bids from all bids 
submitted given that the sale of items was restricted to the set S.  Let k be the (constant) 
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increment required for bidding on a single item. For a bid b(S) to meet the increment, it 
must meet the condition b(S)  v(S) +  k S. 
 
Stopping Rules and Warning Lights.  Two clocks are used: a new bid clock and a new 
provisional winner clock.  The new bid clock resets with each new bid and starts a 
countdown.  Typically, the reset time is from three to five minutes.  The time can be 
shortened as the auction progresses.  The new winner clock resets each time a bid is 
placed that determines a new pattern of provisional winners.  Typically, the reset time is 
between ten and fifteen minutes. Like the new bid clock the time can be shortened as the 
auction proceeds.  
 
The auction ends if either clock reaches zero.  Basically, the new bid clock forces a flow 
of bids, similar to offers in a negotiation and does so under the threat of the auction 
ending.  The new winner clock forces concessions of sufficient magnitude to advance the 
value of the sale.  In essence, the new bid clock says “You must make an offer. You must 
make an offer.”  The new winner clock says “You must make an offer sufficiently to get 
a deal done or the auction ends anyway.”  Thus, the ultimatum feature of game theory is 
operational in both clocks. 
 
If either clock gets within one minute of zero, red “railroad lights” begin to blink on the 
screen.  In essence, the system is constantly pressing for revenue gains by using the threat 
of ending the auction.  While bidders who are not provisional winners do face a dominant 
strategy of bidding as the clock counts down, bid need not be large and there is no 
advantage to waiting until the last moment to bid.  Last moment bids just give 
competitors more time. 
 
Special bids, Robots and Either/or.  Bidders are able to place an either/or bid.  If one bid 
becomes a provisional winner, the other cannot. This feature allows expression of 
indifference across sets.  
 
Robots are available for bidding on single items.  The bidder can instruct the robot to bid 
no more than a stated amount that the bidder can change at any time. The robot will place 
a bid at the minimum increment any time the bid in question is no longer a provisional 
winner. Because bidding on sets requires fashioning bids, the robots are not available for 
bidding on sets. 
 
 
4. Information and Query 
 
Bidders use the information and query functions to fashion bids.  In particular, the 
bidders are given information needed about an entire package as opposed to some 
measure of implicit prices of the items in the package. In contrast to standard rounds 
based auctions, the system does not compute a measure of individual prices, the sum of 
which will indicate whether or not the package will be a provisional winner.  Of course, 
since the system does not compute item prices, substantial information must be made 
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available to bidders in some other form.  Some of this can best be understood by a study 
of the interfaces presented in Section 5 but a key list is included here. 
 
As will become clear, the computations are complex, basically NP complete.  However, 
unlike many auction architectures, the system need not compute prices or temporary 
equilibria based on preferences over all items, submitted by all bidders at the same time.  
Instead, the system responds to a single addition to the bids that exist in the system.  
Conventions exist to respond to computations that are taking too long for fast progression 
of the auction. 
 
Provisional Winners.  A table is published that contains the provisional winner of each 
item, whether the provisionally winning bid is a package bid or a single, the highest bid 
placed on the item as a single, and the highlights of the bids of the bidder who is doing 
the bidding.  
 
The provisionally winning table is updated with each new bid.  New provisionally 
winning bids are accompanied by a small red dot that disappears in a few seconds.  All 
items in a new winning package appear with the red dot.   
 
New non-winning bids are shown as a small black dot on the provisionally winning table. 
The dots also disappear after a few seconds.  These black dots signal the possibility that a 
bidder wants part of a package but cannot bid enough to become a provisional winner and 
seeks partners to bid on the rest of the package from which the bidder wants a portion.  
The black dots carry information that serves to coordinate bidding by coalitions of small 
bidders who want to break up a large package bid. 
 
All Bids.  A page of all bids in the system is published.  It includes the bid number, the 
bidder ID, the items in the package, the time of submission, and the amount of the bid.  
 
Query.  The query system and related functionality serve to replace the role of prices in 
the fashioning of bids.  Important queries can be exercised at the time the bidder 
formulates a bid but before submission.  When potential package is selected for a 
potential bid, the bidder is immediately shown  both the minimum amount that can be bid 
as dictated by the increment requirements and the minimum amount it would take for the 
item to become a provisional winner.  These two operations serve as tools to help bidders 
explore how to fashion bids in relation to the bids in the system.  By adding or removing 
items from a package, the query can be used to determine the marginal cost of adding 
items to a package.  By removing a single item from a package, the bidding required to 
become a provisional winner can be significantly reduced. 
 
Show as Winning.  After a bid is fashioned but before it is submitted, the bidder can 
choose this option to display the pattern of winning and non winning bids that will be the 
consequence of the submission.  It will show all new provisional winners, all bids that 
were provisional winners and remain as such, all bids that were provisional winners and 
now are not, and all bids that were not provisional winners and would be provisional 
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winners if the bid was submitted.  This allows bidders to search more efficiently for 
partners and avoid adding items to a package that would be too costly. 
 
 
5. Interfaces 
 
The interfaces presented here reflect what we have learned about what bidders want to 
know, aided by strategic considerations from game theory.  When observing individual 
behavior in experiments, we follow the principle that the individual is an optimizer 
subject to perception of conditions and options available.  Behavior that is not consistent 
with the incentives that we know exist are viewed as mistakes or misperceptions that the 
properly designed interfaces should prevent.   
 
The interfaces produced in the illustrations below reflect the experience gained from 
experiments. The best way to explain interfaces seems to be to simply show them.  The 
next seven pages are screen shots and explanations of the major functions and how they 
relate to bidder decisions.  The illustrations begin with the home screen and provide a 
map to the other screens. 
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run#,  PIC making offer 
Purple  
Provisional 
Winner of a 
single 
Blue PIC 
Provisional 
Winner of a 
package offer 
Black price       
high single offer 
(not winning due 
to a package 
offer) 
1. Make sure you are here 
      Red dot is a 
new Provisional 
Winner 
    Black dot is 
new non-
winning offer 
            means 
you are the 
Provisional 
Winner 
Gold
Illustration 3. View the Offers  (Provisional Winners) 
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Illustration 4. Ending the Auction 
Each new bid resets the 
new bid clock to three 
minutes (unless 
otherwise announced).
Each new Provisional 
Winner resets the new 
winner clock to ten 
minutes (unless 
otherwise announced). 
The auction ends when either the new 
bid clock or the new winner clock 
counts down to zero. Time on both 
clocks means that the auction is still 
open for bidding on all items. 
When the auction ends the Provisional 
Winners become the Auction 
Winners. 
Watch the clocks 
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Illustration 5. Offer Management (Offer Modification 
1. Make sure you are 
here 
2. Cancel a non Provisional 
Winning offer:  
a. Select the offer 
b. Cancel Selected Bids 
3.2 Modify an offer: 
b. Select a new price or c. 
Change package     d.  
4. Return to Offer 
Submission Form 
Total dollars for your 
provisional winners 
3.1 Modify an offer:      a.        
Select the offer  
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1. Make sure you are here 
PIC of bidder making 
the offer,  
Bid number, Offer 
price,  
Items in offer, 
Time entered 
  
 
      You are 
Provisional Winner 
 
 
 
 
Provisional Winner 
 
 
 
    Currently non 
Provisional Winner 
Gold 
Yellow 
White 
2. Return to Provisional
Winners screen 
Illustration 6. View the Offers (Complete Offer List)
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  Illustration 7. Strategy Tools 
1. Select 
item(s) 2. Add selected 
to offer 
3. Show as 
Winning
4. Return to 
Provisional Winners 
Screen 
 Your offer if submitted 
This offer remains a 
Provisional Winner 
Your offer bumps them
A partner used to bump 
packages with your 
offer 
Offer was out and 
remains out 
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6. Performance 
 
Performance of the continuous combinatorial auction is addressed in three sections.  The 
first section describes the experimental parameters.  The section assumes an 
understanding of preference inducement, the nature of subject training and instruction. 
Much of what we know and can measure is derived from experiments and experimental 
testbeds.   The second section is a sketch of the parameters in experiments and the third is 
a highlight of some experimental results. The third section reports the major properties of 
two field applications. 
 
Experimental testbed methodology reflects an attempt to learn about mechanisms and 
environments that have never existed before in naturally occurring environments.  Data 
from the field does not exist and appropriate data might even be impossible to get.  
Furthermore, the method operates in a world in which theory is suggestive but limited.  
The fact that the theory is incomplete suggests that “theory testing” is not necessarily a 
testbed objective because the answer to the question of whether the theory is true or not is 
already known.  Certainly it is not true because it is incomplete and therefore vulnerable 
to a variety of sources of rejection. 
 
Three questions are posed in a testbed.  (1) Does the mechanism do what it is supposed to 
do?  The question asks for a demonstration of proof of principle.  (2) Does the 
mechanism do it does for understandable reasons? The question asks about a test of 
design consistency. The question asks if  the result reflects the theory that was used in the 
design or are they simply random?  Clearly, this is a basic question because it asks about 
the possibility that the design will scale.  (3) Will the mechanism work in the proposed 
field environment?  Of course, this third question is a key.  It asks about the robustness of 
the theory when applied to possibly unknown conditions.  It calls for tests under a variety 
of environments that could challenge the performance.  The test environments might look 
nothing at all like “the real world” because the real world in which one might imagine the 
mechanism being deployed might not have conditions that theory suggests are stressful.  
On the other hand, testing in environments that might closely resemble the application 
environment might prove valuable in uncovering interactions with institutions and 
aspects of the environment that might not be anticipated by theory..  Institutional facts 
and environmental features can interact in surprising ways and have negative effects on 
performance. Examples of both types of environments are reported in the second section. 
 
Experimental Parameters 
Standard experimental economics techniques are used to induce incentives.  Of course, 
explaining preferences with synergies is a bit of a trick.  Special techniques were used for 
that task.1 
                                           
1 We will call our method of inducing preferences over sets “The basis method for synergies inducement”.  
A subject is given an array of subsets with a value attached to each that operates as a basis from which the 
value of any subset can be computed.  The array is determined by the specific preference over sets, the 
pattern of preference synergies that the experimenter wants to induce.  The array is a type of basis for 
computing the value of any subset.  To find the value of an arbitrary set S start with the first element of the 
array and continue along the array to the very first subset of S, call it S1. Record the value of S1. Continue 
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Three classes of parameters existed for stress tests of the mechanism.  The optimal 
allocations for the first sets are shown in Figures 1 and 3.  Twenty items are to be 
allocated to five bidders.  A representative indifference curve is drawn in the figure for 
each of the five bidders.  Each of the bidders has an incentive to buy all twenty items 
should the prices be sufficiently low. The arrows are rough indicators of the gradient 
directions. The indifference curves cannot illustrate the synergies among the items, but 
the complementarities exist except when the items are “far” away from the maximum.  
For items near the maximum (about nine items), the purchase of any pair of items 
produces a value more than the sum of the values of the two items when the items are 
evaluated independently.  
 
Efficiency is the measure used to assess performance.  Assume that each individual bids 
the actual value of all packages. Under such assumptions the revenue that would be 
produced by the auction is a measure of potential “social benefits” and since the revenue 
is maximized it serves as a measure of the maximum possible benefits.   In an 
experimental auction, the values are induced and are thus known to the experimenter. 
Thus, at the conclusion of the auction the allocations are known and the value of items to 
the bidder to whom they are allocated can be computed and summed.  Call it the “total 
value received” by the bidders, independent of the prices paid. 
   auction efficiency = total value received/maximum possible surplus. 
The efficiency is a type of cost/benefit measure only in the case of the auction in which 
the cost to the seller plays no role,  there is no social cost, only benefits of the demand 
side.  Typically, prices are an issue of income distribution as opposed to efficiency in 
allocation so the net benefits, value minus cost to bidders, are not part of the 
measurement.  
 
The patterns of efficient allocations for the relatively easy parameters are Figure 1. As 
can be seen, four participants should acquire four adjacent items, resulting in four square 
patterns of allocations.  The fifth bidder should acquire all items in the column to the 
right. 
 
In the relatively hard parameters of Figure 2, four bidders have exactly the same 
preferences as existed in Figure 1. Three bidders are added and the resulting optimal 
pattern is illustrated in Figure 2.  One of the new bidders should win the four units in the 
center.  The two other new bidders should each acquire a unit at the extreme of the fifth 
column. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
along the array to the first subset of S\S1. Call it S2. Record the value of S2. Continue along the array to the 
first proper subset of S\S1\S2 and call it S3. Record the value of S3. Continue the process until all units of S 
have been included in a subset. Add the recorded values to get the value of S. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expe
Whil
the in
repor
four u
one r
 
The f
phase
seen,
param
were 
exper
inclu
subje
incor
appli
 
Fig
rimental t
e many expe
terfaces and
ted in Table
se the hard 
easonably la
ive easy cas
, when both
 the experim
eter experim
with experie
iments on 0
ded as exam
ct misunder
porated in m
cations. 
ure 1 rela
ests 
riments wer
 functionali
 1. Five exp
parameters.
rge scale ex
e parameter
 software an
ents were re
ents are re
nced subjec
60525 were
ples of what
standings w
odified train
tively easy
e conducted
ty of the me
eriment in th
  In addition
periment are
 experiment
d instructio
gularly prod
ported. The 
ts and resul
 not conduct
 can be reve
ere addresse
ing procedu
 
 paramete
15 
, most lead 
chanism.  N
e table are b
 to the expe
 reported. 
s were cond
n procedure
ucing effici
experiments
ted in an eff
ed with app
aled by the 
d following 
res as the p
rs F
to changes i
ine small sc
ased on the
riments in th
ucted near th
s had becom
encies near 
 on 060511
iciency of 1
ropriately tr
testbed.  Th
these exper
roject move
igure 2 re
n the instruc
ale experim
 easy param
e table, the 
e end of the
e stabilized
100 %.  Fou
 and the two
00%. The tw
ained subjec
e sources of
iments and w
d toward th
latively  h
tions and 
ents and 
eters and 
results of 
 testing 
.  As can be
r hard 
 on 060524 
o 
ts and are 
 the obvious
ere 
e 
ard param
 
 
eters 
16 
 
Table 1:  Data 
DATA Number 
of 
bidders 
Efficient 
allocation 
value 
Actual 
allocation 
value 
Efficiency note: 
experimental 
parameters 
060411A 5 14296 14296 100% easy 
060411B 5 14296 14296 100% easy 
060517A 5 14926 14926 100% easy 
060519A 5 14296 14296 100% easy 
060519B 5 14296 14296 100% easy 
060511 8 10000 10000 100% hard 
060524 8 10000 10000 100% hard 
060525A 8 10000 8550 85.5% hard –A person 
bought almost all 
– lost money 
060525B 8 10000 6900 69% hard – A key 
person bought 
only 1 and lost 
money on it. 
     The two poor 
formers are 
included as 
examples that 
demonstrate the 
nature of the 
insights produced 
by testbed 
experiments. 
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Figure 3.  Experiment 060526 50 items 30 bidders: Revenue and Efficiency. 
 
 
As can be viewed in the figure, the revenue starts at a low level and rapidly increases, 
following an almost concave path and finally asymptotes at the level where the auction 
ends naturally as dictated by the clocks.  The efficiency level converges to a level of 
approximately 90%.  Revenues clearly approach an asymptote but as is the case with 
combinatorial auctions, there is some ambiguity about the appropriate equilibrium 
concept so the predicted revenue is not known. 
 
Field applications 
The results of two field applications are reported in this section.  Of course, the details of 
parameters are unknown so efficiencies and maximum possible revenues are unknown.  
However, the time series are instructive and hold the impression of similarity to 
experiments conducted under laboratory conditions. 
 
The results of an auction for 100 metric ton pallets of natural rubber are contained in 
Figure 4.  Four internet bidders located around the world competed for 22 pallets of 
natural rubber located in a warehouse in Vietnam.  The auction was conducted by the 
United Nations International Natural Rubber Organization, which had accumulated the 
pallets as part of a price stabilization program and was prepared to release the natural 
rubber back to private companies.  Buyer identities were not public information. 
 
The pallets were from different plantations. Natural rubber from a given plantation is a 
homogeneous product but rubber from different plantations has different and well known 
qualities. Starting bids were tendered by bidders as sealed bids.  These bidders were 
accustomed to bidding in sealed bid environments and the initial bids are similar to other 
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sealed bids that the administrator for the INRO auction had observed and the bids were 
approximately market prices that exist in public markets.  The initial bids on the rubber 
from different plantations reflected the difference of quality among the different 
plantations. Bids tended to be the same for rubber from the same plantation but bids 
differed for rubber from different plantations. Scale preferences were also evident. Bids 
for packages were frequently tendered. One bidder wanted all of the rubber in the 
warehouse and at the auction opening placed the high bid on all items for sale.  This 
bidder ended the auction with ten pallets while the three other winners ended with 6, 5 
and 1 pallets respectively. 
 
Package bidding followed quickly after the initial bids. Some bidders expressed values 
for rubber from a limited set of plantations and others seemed to be interested in a mix 
with some sensitivity to price and quantity.  The black dots appeared throughout the 
auction, signaling a bid on part of an existing larger package bid.  The auction took about 
two hours and the “railroad lights” tended to appear signaling a threat to end the auction 
in the absence of bidding.   
 
Total revenue in the INRO auction follows an approximately concave movement over 
time.  If the starting revenue of $884,975 is assumed to be the revenue that would have 
been produced by a sealed bid when compared with the $927,000 auction revenue, the 
combinatorial auction produced about 5.5% more revenue.  The flat places in the time 
series reveal instances of no bids (and thus the warning clock flashes) which increase in 
frequency as the auction progressed.  Such patterns exist in experimental data. 
 
The second field application examined is an auction for aquaculture sites located in Port 
Phillip Bay near Melbourne, Australia.   The sites are appropriate for the growing of 
bivalve shellfish.  The state of Victoria decided to auction eighteen sites.   A total of ten 
bidders participated and bid for 18 sites.  Seven bidders were winners producing 
$575,000 in revenue.  The sites were scattered across six locations.  Bidders were 
interested in scale since they must meet regular demand for deliveries.  They are also 
interested in a portfolio of sites reflecting a diversity of location due to currents, winds, 
possible diseases, and location relative to home base and delivery points. Thus multiple 
synergies existed and package bids were used frequently2 . 
 
The revenue and timing from the aquaculture auction are displayed in Figures 5a, 5b and 
5c.  Figure 5a demonstrates the typical concavity of revenue when displayed in clock 
time over the approximate 2 hours of the auction.  The delay in the middle of the figure 
reflects an equipment problem that delayed the auction for about five minutes3.  Bids are 
entered rapidly at first (shown in Figure 5b) and then slow down as the auction advances 
                                           
2 The total number of bids was 300 of which 129 were bids for packages of items and 171 were bids on 
single items.  The auction lasted about 7000 seconds which means that a bid or ask was arriving every 5 
seconds or so.  There were 1032 query, about 3.5 query per bid, so something was happening about every 4 
seconds not counting cancellations and other activities. 
3 Someone unplugged to power to the server at the remote location where the auction was held.  The event 
illustrates the need for review and testing of every mode in which an online auction might fail.  The fact 
that the recovery was complete and fast, with no apparent disruption to the auction suggests the existence 
of considerable background research not covered in this brief paper. 
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7. Summary and Observations 
 
Several features of the mechanism are worth emphasis.  The absence of a concept of a 
price per item is a departure from tradition.   Replacing the measures contained in prices 
are queries and displays that can respond to human pattern recognition and crafted 
information needs. Obviously the economic content of a concept of prices is working in 
the background but the operation of the mechanism is not based on their use. The use of 
clocks is important.  They carry key public information and create the proper level of 
incentives for coordination.  A bidder need only meet an increment requirement to keep a 
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negotiation alive before facing an all or none choice of implementing a “contribution” to 
the public good of breaking up a large bid or collections of bids and becoming a 
provisional winner. The dots provide feedback by calling attention to actions of others 
and the possible intentions that underlay the actions of others play. This type of 
information that contributes to coalition formation plays a key role.   
 
Computational problems can clearly pose problems as the size of the auction grows but 
the ability to solve big problems depends on the structure of the problem and the 
computing technology.   Continuous combinatorial auctions much larger than reported 
here have been conducted. The computations times we encountered were all measured in 
fractions of seconds even when hundreds of bids exist in the set of all bids.   Of course, 
ways exist to reduce the computational problem at the expense of limitations on 
permissible bids.  Such restrictions have been tested but not used. 
 
The testbed methods have some departures from what an untutored theorist might expect.  
The methods are designed to address problems where the theory is not complete and 
might be no more than suggestive.  Tests of such theories do not make much sense when 
research is confronted by a scale of limited budget, limited time, and an unbounded 
infinity of variables.  Yet, the role of theory plays a fundamental role.  Theory, regardless 
of how incomplete it might be, is the tool that takes the analysis from the limited 
observations under controlled conditions to the substantially unknown conditions of the 
field.  The theory must be robust and the testbeds help establish that. 
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